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1. Introduction 
The construction and interpretation of utterances is the primary goal of every act of 
linguistic communication. The linguistic processes by which this goal is achieved are the 
focus of the study of pragmatics (Cummings, 2005). Pragmatics is now an established part of 
the university linguistics curriculum. Today, undergraduate and postgraduate courses in 
linguistics are as likely to contain modules on pragmatics as they are modules on phonetics, 
phonology and syntax. One might reasonably expect a similar situation to exist in the 
teaching of linguistics to students of speech and language therapy (SLT). After all, there can 
be little doubt that pragmatic disorders represent a significant part of the clinical caseload 
of therapists (see Cummings (2009) for discussion of developmental and acquired pragmatic 
disorders). Also, pragmatics is more closely aligned than any other linguistic discipline to the 
need to achieve functional communication for severely impaired clients, and to develop 
forms of assessment and treatment which place an emphasis on communication in 
naturalistic contexts. Yet, when one examines the provision of linguistics in SLT courses, 
pragmatics is not a central plank of the clinical education of speech and language therapy 
students. While dedicated modules in phonology and syntax are commonplace (see 
chapters 4 and 6, this volume), pragmatics is seldom taught as a subject in its own right. 
More often than not, pragmatics is merely one component in a more general linguistics 
module. This lack of emphasis on pragmatics fails to reflect the significant communication 
burden created by disorders of pragmatics and is a poor preparation for students who will 
draw extensively on this linguistic discipline during their professional lives. 
 
It is of some interest to ask why this lack of prominence has been afforded to pragmatics in 
SLT courses. I want to suggest that this situation has arisen in large part because lecturers 
are uncertain about which aspects of pragmatics are relevant to SLT students and also about 
how best to deliver those aspects within the classroom. The experience and expertise of the 
lecturers who deliver this teaching is particularly significant in this regard. I have found 
myself in the rather unique position of pursuing a career in academic linguistics having come 
from a clinical background in speech and language therapy. When I have taught pragmatics 
to SLT students, I have been able to draw on my understanding of pragmatic disorders in 
children and adults to help me decide which pragmatic concepts and theories are most 
relevant to these students and how best to present this area of linguistics to them. Most 
lecturers who teach linguistics to SLT students have not had the benefit of a clinical 
education. Their knowledge of pragmatics is largely theoretical in nature and is often poorly 
suited to the clinical needs of SLT students. Moreover, adapting this knowledge to a clinical 
context is not easy and, in many cases, is not successfully achieved.  
 
In this chapter, I aim to assist the lecturer who is charged with delivering pragmatics to SLT 
students to address the challenges of this teaching assignment. In section 2, I examine the 
learning outcomes that a SLT student should achieve as a result of studying a course in 
pragmatics. The core elements of the curriculum in such a course will be examined in 
section 3. Each pragmatic concept will first be examined on its own terms. There will then 
be a brief survey of the clinical populations which are known to have difficulty with the 
pragmatic concept concerned. Actual clinical data, some of which is presented online, will 
also be used to demonstrate these difficulties. In section 4, I describe some of the teaching 
methods which can be used in the classroom. Summative and formative assessment is a key 
component of the delivery of a course in pragmatics and will be described in section 5. A 
cautionary note about pitfalls is included in section 6, and a conclusion is drawn in section 7.   
 
2. Learning outcomes 
The following five learning outcomes are essential to any course in pragmatics that is taught 
to SLT students. These outcomes are shaped not merely by the learning needs of any 
student who is studying this linguistic discipline, but also by the specific role that pragmatics 
may be expected to play in the professional knowledge of speech and language therapists. 
In no particular order of importance, these outcomes are: 
 
(1) Students need to understand pragmatic concepts on their own terms. Central pragmatic 
concepts include speech act, implicature, presupposition and deixis. They also include 
notions such as context which are more often assumed rather than directly examined in 
pragmatics courses (Cummings, 2012). The origins of these concepts in the philosophical 
work of Grice, Austin and Searle should form part of students’ basic knowledge of 
pragmatics. 
 
(2) Students need to understand how pragmatics relates to other language levels. It is 
important for students to appreciate how pragmatic constraints relating to politeness, for 
example, can affect lexical and grammatical choices in the planning of utterances by 
speakers. It is also vital that students have a well-developed sense of the relationship 
between semantics and pragmatics and where boundaries on semantic and pragmatic 
aspects of meaning can be reasonably drawn (see chapter 7, this volume). This learning 
outcome is essential to understanding the compensatory interactions between pragmatics 
and other language levels which are often observed in clients, e.g. the adult with aphasia 
who can use pragmatic knowledge to compensate for deficits in receptive syntax. 
 
(3) Students need to understand the relationship of pragmatics to cognition. Cognition may 
be taken to include specific constructs such as theory of mind (Cummings, 2013a, 2013b) 
and a range of executive function skills which are known to impact on the pragmatic skills of 
clients (see chapter 4 in Cummings (2014) for discussion). This learning outcome is 
important as a cognitive reorientation of pragmatics is necessary in order to render the 
largely philosophical concepts of the discipline of use to a description of pragmatic disorder. 
 
(4) Students need to apply their knowledge of pragmatics to an analysis of clinical data. 
There is an undeniable gulf between theoretical knowledge of pragmatics on the one hand 
and an application of this knowledge to an analysis of pragmatic disorders on the other 
hand. To a large extent, this gulf can be bridged by appropriate teaching and assessment 
methods (see sections 4 and 5 below). It requires the lecturer in a pragmatics course to 
embed actual clinical data throughout all aspects of the content and delivery of such a 
course. 
 
(5) Students need to understand and follow how theoretical developments in pragmatics 
relate to the description, assessment and treatment of pragmatic disorders. Pragmatic 
theories such as relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, [1986] 1995) and cognitive 
pragmatics theory (Bara, 2010) can bring new insights to all aspects of the understanding 
and management of pragmatic disorders (see chapter 5 in Cummings (2014) for discussion). 
This learning outcome is essential if the management of clients is to have a rational basis in 
the best available theoretical developments in the field, and if the study of pragmatic 
disorders is to have any prospect of informing those developments.  
 
3. Core curriculum components 
In this section, the components of a course on pragmatics for SLT students are outlined. 
Limitations of space preclude a comprehensive treatment of all these components. For this 
reason, the following concepts and topics will be examined: implicature, speech act, 
presupposition and discourse features. While this list is not exhaustive, it is sufficiently 
representative to provide a starting point for lecturers. A three-part structure, which 
consists of units, clinical descriptors and clinical data, is employed. The rationale for this 
structure is given in section 4. 
 
3.1 Implicature 
Unit (a) Meaning beyond the proposition: During communication, speakers and hearers 
exchange utterances with a view to conveying meaning beyond that expressed by the 
proposition of an utterance. For example, in the following exchange between Pam and Tom, 
Tom’s utterance is not merely serving to inform Pam about the household chores he did 
perform. Rather, his utterance is also telling Pam about the household chores he did not 
perform: 
 
Pam: Did you clean the bathroom and fold the laundry? 
Tom: I folded the laundry. 
Implicature: Tom did not clean the bathroom. 
 
What this example demonstrates is that speakers and hearers are skilled at using language 
to convey a range of meanings that are not encoded in the truth-conditional content (i.e. 
proposition) of an utterance. Nevertheless, these meanings are attached to this content and 
represent a development of it. A specification of these meanings, and how hearers arrive at 
them, has become the single biggest question of the modern study of pragmatics. 
 
Unit (b) Grice and meaning: Grice used the term ‘implicature’ to describe the level of 
meaning that goes beyond the proposition. Where theorists had previously characterized 
communication in terms of the encoding and decoding of propositions, Grice was the first 
theorist to represent communication as the exchange of communicative intentions between 
speakers and hearers. In this way, what motivates Pam’s question in the above exchange is 
her desire to establish the household chores that Tom has undertaken. Tom readily 
recognizes this desire as Pam’s communicative intention in producing the utterance. 
Moreover, Tom’s response to Pam’s question is motivated by a communicative intention of 
his own. Clearly, he wishes to convey to Pam the particular chore that he has completed. 
Additionally, however, he needs to make her aware that he did not clean the bathroom. To 
the extent that there was an expectation in place that he should have cleaned the 
bathroom, Tom has decided to convey his lack of bathroom cleaning indirectly to Pam by 
way of an implicature. The entire exchange is much more about the recognition of 
communicative intentions, and the need to address those intentions, than it is about the 
transmission of linguistic utterances with certain fixed or invariant meanings. This view of 
communication as the exchange of communicative intentions has been one of Grice’s most 
important contributions to the field of pragmatics. 
  
Unit (c) Cooperative principle and maxims: The rational expectations between speakers 
and hearers which make exchanges of the type between Pam and Tom possible are 
captured by Grice in his cooperative principle and maxims. The cooperative principle may be 
taken to apply to all forms of rational, cooperative behaviour. It is not simply a principle 
which is intended to apply to conversations and verbal communication, as the following 
remark of Grice indicates: ‘if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed 
a good book or even an oven cloth’ (Grice, 1975: 47). The cooperative principle issues the 
following imperative: ‘Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which 
you are engaged’ (Grice, 1975: 45). This principle is fleshed out through four maxims: 
quality, quantity, relation and manner. The quality maxim urges that we do not say that 
which we believe to be false or that for which we lack adequate evidence. The quantity 
maxim cautions us not to give more information than is required but also not to give less 
information than is necessary. The relation maxim requires that we be relevant, while the 
manner maxim asks that we be brief and orderly, and avoid ambiguous, obscure language.  
 
Applied to the above case of Pam and Tom, this Gricean framework operates as follows. 
Even though Tom’s response to Pam’s question appears to be under-informative and is an 
apparent violation of the maxim of quantity – Pam has asked about two household chores 
and Tom mentions only one – Pam nevertheless assumes that Tom is committed to the 
cooperative principle in his exchange with her. (To assume otherwise is to abandon all 
prospect of engaging in communication.) Pam uses this assumption of cooperation to derive 
the implicature that while Tom has folded the laundry, he has failed to clean the bathroom. 
Grice remained uncommitted about the type of subconscious inferences that hearers use to 
recover the implicatures of utterances. The exact nature of these inferences remains to this 
day a question of considerable interest to theorists in pragmatics.  
 
Unit (d) Non-compliance with maxims: It was described above how Tom had apparently 
violated the quantity maxim in his response to Pam’s question. But violations of Grice’s 
maxims may also be overt in nature. Overt violations are an important category as they are 
the basis of implicatures involved in irony, metaphor, hyperbole and understatement in 
language. For example, the speaker who utters ‘What a delightful child!’ upon encountering 
a disruptive 5-year-old boy, is overtly violating the quality maxim with a view to conveying 
ironic or sarcastic intent. However, as well as engaging in overt violations of maxims, 
speakers may engage in covert violations of maxims, as when a speaker tells lies (the quality 
maxim is covertly violated in this case). Speakers may also opt out of the cooperative 
principle and maxims, as when a politician responds to the questions of reporters by saying 
‘no comment’. Finally, there may be a clash of maxims where in order to satisfy one maxim 
a speaker must breach a second maxim. For example, in the exchange below Mary has had 
to privilege the maxim of quality over the maxim of quantity in her response to John’s 
question: 
 
John: Has the newspaper boy delivered this morning? 
Mary: I’ve not heard the front gate being opened. 
 
Clearly, Mary’s response is under-informative as a reply to John’s question – she has not 
been able to tell John what he wants to know. However, in an effort to avoid saying 
something which will answer John’s question fully but which may well be false, Mary choses 
the less informative, but more truthful response that she has not heard the front gate being 
opened. 
 
Unit (e) Types of implicature: Grice recognized four different types of implicature. For a 
particularized conversational implicature to come about, a specific context must be present. 
If A asks ‘Are you coming to the pub later?’ and B responds ‘My parents are in town’, A may 
reasonably take B to be implicating that he will not be going to the pub later. Of course, this 
particular implicature is based on the assumption that B wants to see his parents. However, 
in a different context, another implicature altogether may arise. If A knows that B does not 
have a good relationship with his parents, then B may be taken to implicate that he will 
happily go to the pub later as a means of avoiding his parents. In a generalized 
conversational implicature, no specific context is required for an implicature to come about. 
For example, in the utterance ‘Sally sat in a garden and watched a child climb over the wall’, 
there is a generalized conversational implicature to the effect that the garden which Sally 
sat in and the child whom she watched are not her own. This implicature is related to the 
use of the indefinite article ‘a’ rather than to a specific context.  
 
A scalar implicature is a type of generalized conversational implicature. In the utterance 
‘Mike attended some of the classes’ there is a scalar implicature to the effect that he did not 
attend all the classes. The terms <all, most, many, some> differ in informational strength, 
with ‘all’ the semantically strongest and ‘some’ the semantically weakest terms in the set. 
By asserting the weakest term ‘some’, a speaker may be taken to implicate ‘not 
all/most/many’. Finally, a conventional implicature is attached to specific lexical items in 
utterances and does not depend on context. For example, in the utterance ‘The woman is 
obese but healthy’, there is a conventional implicature attached to ‘but’ that it was not 
expected that the woman would be healthy. 
 
Clinical descriptor: Implicatures have been extensively studied in clinical subjects. Almost 
without exception, these studies have examined the comprehension of implicatures (the 
production of implicatures has been largely neglected in these studies). Problems with the 
processing of implicatures have been identified in children with autism and specific 
language impairment (Surian, 1996; Ryder et al., 2008) and in adults with left-hemisphere 
damage and schizophrenia (Corcoran and Frith, 1996; Kasher et al., 1999; Tényi et al., 2002). 
Most studies have investigated particularized conversational implicatures. More recently, 
investigators have started to examine scalar implicatures in clinical subjects (e.g. Pijnacker 
et al., 2009).  
 
Clinical data:  
Case 1: The maxim of relation is clearly not observed in the following extract of language 
produced by a schizophrenic client. Initially, this client appears to make a relevant response. 
However, he soon veers off topic into complete irrelevance. There is an additional pragmatic 
anomaly in that comments about the doctor’s tie breach the politeness constraints that 
normally characterize medical interactions between doctors and their clients.    
 
‘Then I left San Francisco and moved to…where did you get that tie? It looks like 
it’s left over from the 1950s. I like the warm weather in San Diego. Is that a 
conch shell on your desk? Have you ever gone scuba diving?’ (Thomas, 1997:41) 
 
Case 2: See website. 
 
3.2 Speech act 
Unit (a) Austin and meaning: Traditionally, the dominant conception of language meaning 
has been a semantic one. Under this conception, the meaning of the sentences in a 
language consists in the conditions which must hold in the world in order for those 
sentences to be true. That is, according to a semantic conception, language meaning is 
defined in terms of truth conditions. In the 1940s and 1950s, a group of Oxford philosophers 
headed by John Austin began to challenge this dominant conception of language meaning. 
According to these philosophers, not all sentences in a language report or describe states of 
affairs in the world. While many sentences do function as declaratives, many more 
sentences can be used to ask questions, command or request people to do things and issue 
threats and warnings. These non-declarative sentences were overlooked within a semantic 
conception of language meaning. They assumed centre stage for the first time with the 
emergence of the ordinary language philosophies of John Austin and his colleagues. 
 
Unit (b) Performative utterances: In How to Do Things with Words, Austin (1962) discusses 
at length a distinction between constative and performative utterances. Constative 
utterances describe states of affairs in the world and are true or false. Performative 
utterances do not describe anything and are not themselves true or false. Rather, the 
speaker who produces these utterances has thereby performed some act. For example, the 
speaker who utters ‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth 2’ has performed an act of naming. 
Even though this act of naming is not itself true or false, the situation which obtains 
following the performance of this utterance – that there is a ship called the QE2 – is 
something which is true. It is these latter utterances which Austin calls speech acts. Many 
performative utterances are explicity indicated through performative verbs, as in ‘I baptise 
this child Mary Williams’ and ‘I bet you ten pounds that it will snow tomorrow’. Other 
performatives are not signalled through the use of verbs, such as when the utterance ‘I will 
revise for three hours tonight’ is used to make a promise.  
 
In How to Do Things with Words, Austin rejected ultimately the distinction between 
constative and performative utterances and argued that all utterances are performatives in 
the sense that he intended. He further delineated three main types of speech act which 
occur when someone says something. If we take the utterance ‘It is raining outside’ as our 
example, the locutionary act is closest to the semantic notion of a proposition and captures 
the sense and reference of the terms which make up this linguistic expression. In describing 
the weather conditions, the locutionary act is a description of a state of affairs in the world. 
The speaker who uses this utterance may be suggesting to the hearer that he stays indoors 
for another ten minutes or that he takes an umbrella with him. The act of suggesting is a 
type of illocutionary act which is performed in saying something. Other common 
illocutionary acts include requesting, apologizing and threatening. Finally, if by producing 
this utterance the speaker has some effect on the hearer, he has also performed a 
perlocutionary act. So if the hearer is persuaded to stay indoors a little longer or fetch an 
umbrella, the speaker has performed a perlocutionary act by saying something.  
 
Unit (c) Felicity conditions: John Searle revised and expanded upon many of Austin’s ideas. 
In Speech Acts, Searle (1969) set out the felicity conditions on the performance and 
satisfaction of speech acts. Conditions on the performance of speech acts were captured in 
preparatory, propositional content, sincerity and essential rules (Searle, 1969: 63). Applied 
to the speech act of promising, these rules operate as follows. The speaker who utters ‘I 
promise to wash your car on Saturday’ can only be said to have done so felicitously if the 
hearer wants his car to be washed and the speaker believes this to be so, and the speaker 
and hearer believe that the speaker would not wash the car as part of the normal course of 
events (preparatory rules). The speaker’s utterance must predicate the right sort of act on 
the part of the speaker (propositional content rule). There must also be a sincere intention 
to wash the car on the part of the speaker (sincerity rule). Finally, the speaker’s utterance 
must count as an undertaking to perform the action being promised (essential rule). These 
rules do more than specify the conditions on the felicitous performance of speech acts. 
Searle (1979: 45-48) also described how speakers can produce indirect speech acts by 
exploiting the shared knowledge of these rules between speakers and hearers. In 
performing a directive – a speech act in which the speaker gets someone to do something – 
a preparatory condition is that the hearer can perform the action that is requested. By 
directly questioning this preparatory condition in an utterance like ‘Can you tell me the 
time?’, the hearer knows that the speaker is making an indirect request to be given the 
time. 
 
Clinical descriptor: Unlike implicatures, investigators have examined the comprehension 
and production of speech acts by clinical subjects to a similar extent. Various speech acts 
have been studied, including directives (requests), assertives (statements), commitments 
and direct and indirect speech acts. Findings have been varied. There is evidence that 
autistic children and children with Asperger’s syndrome make reduced use of assertive 
speech acts and that this is related to theory of mind impairments (Ziatas et al., 2003). 
Mentally retarded school-age children can use contextual and linguistic clues to achieve 
comprehension of target speech acts (Abbeduto et al., 1998), while children with specific 
language impairment use directives, statements and questions to the same extent as 
younger siblings but use a lower percentage of commitments than siblings (Rollins et al., 
1994). An equally diverse set of clinical findings has been reported in adult clients with 
fluent and nonfluent aphasia, senile dementia of the Alzheimer’s type, acquired brain 
damage and right-hemisphere damage (Ripich et al., 1991; Drummond and Simmons, 1995; 
McDonald and Pearce, 1998; Vanhalle et al., 2000). 
 
Clinical data:  
Case 3: In a study by Loukusa et al. (2007), a researcher is showing a 9-year-old boy with 
Asperger’s syndrome a picture of a mother and a girl. The girl has a dress on and she is 
running. There are muddy puddles on the road. The girl has just stepped in the puddle and 
the picture shows the mud splashing. The researcher reads the following verbal scenario 
aloud and then asks a question: ‘The girl with her best clothes on is running on the dirty 
road. The mother shouts to the girl: ‘‘Remember that you have your best clothes on!’’ What 
does the mother mean?’. The boy responds ‘You have your best clothes on’. 
 
The boy’s response indicates that he has failed to establish the illocutionary force of the 
mother’s utterance. The mother’s utterance is clearly functioning as a warning to the girl to 
keep her clothes clean. The boy’s simple repetition of part of the mother’s utterance 
suggests that he has been unable to recognize the speech act that is being performed by 
this utterance. Such an error is consistent with the theory of mind difficulties that are found 
in children and adults with Asperger’s syndrome.   
 
Case 4: See website. 
 
3.3 Presupposition 
Unit (a) Definition of presupposition: Although it has been variously defined, 
presupposition may be taken to represent information which is backgrounded, taken for 
granted or assumed in a linguistic interaction. This information generally forms part of the 
mutual knowledge between a speaker and a hearer. For example, Jack’s utterance in the 
following exchange presupposes that he and Jane know that there is a house on the hill and 
that it has been up for sale before: 
 
Jack: The house on the hill is for sale again. 
Jane: That must be the second time this year. 
 
Presupposition represents a significant resource for the management of information 
between speakers and hearers. Linguistic communication would be very cumbersome 
indeed if nothing could be assumed by the participants in an exchange. Imagine if Jack could 
not make certain assumptions about Mary’s knowledge state. Before producing his 
utterance in the above exchange, he would first have to tell Mary that there is a house on 
the hill and that it has been for sale before. The explicit communication of this information 
is inefficient and costly in cognitive terms. This cost and inefficiency can be avoided through 
the use of presupposition. 
 
Unit (b) Presupposition triggers: A number of lexical items and constructions are a source of 
presuppositions in language. These so-called presupposition ‘triggers’ include the definite 
description ‘the house on the hill’ and the iterative expression ‘again’ in Jack’s utterance in 
the above exchange. The definite description triggers a presupposition of existence – there 
is a house on the hill – while the iterative expression triggers a presupposition that the 
house has been for sale before. Other presupposition triggers include cleft constructions 
such as ‘It was the teenager who vandalised the car’ where there is a presupposition that 
someone vandalised the car, and factive verbs such as ‘Sue and Bill regretted getting a 
divorce’ where the verb ‘regret’ presupposes a fact, namely, that Sue and Bill got divorced. 
The list of triggers continues as follows: change-of-state verbs (e.g. ‘When did you stop 
jogging?’ presupposes that the hearer had been jogging); implicative verbs (e.g. ‘The police 
managed to intercept the car’ presupposes that the police tried to intercept the car); 
comparisons of equality (e.g. ‘Henry is as overweight as Oscar’ presupposes that Oscar is 
overweight); temporal clauses (e.g. ‘After he visited his mother, the man went into town’ 
presupposes that the man visited his mother); comparatives (e.g. ‘Delia Smith is a better 
chef than Jamie Oliver’ presupposes that Delia Smith and Jamie Oliver are both chefs), and 
counterfactual conditionals (e.g. ‘If I were the US president, I would introduce free 
healthcare’ presupposes that the speaker is not the US president). 
 
Unit (c) Features of presuppositions: A key feature of presuppositions is their survival 
(constancy) under negation. The utterance ‘The doctors managed to save the child’ 
presupposes that the doctors tried to save the child, but entails that the doctors did save 
the child. Only the presupposition of the utterance survives negation: ‘The doctors did not 
manage to save the child’ still presupposes that the doctors tried to save the child, but no 
longer entails that the doctors saved the child. A further important feature of 
presuppositions is their defeasibility or cancellability. Presuppositions can be cancelled or 
defeated under certain conditions. One such condition is when they are inconsistent with 
background knowledge. For example, the temporal clause in the utterance ‘Sally left for 
New York before she completed the investigation’ typically triggers the presupposition that 
Sally completed the investigation. However, this same presupposition is defeated or 
cancelled in the context of the utterance ‘Sally was killed in a car accident before she 
completed the investigation’ because we know that a person cannot complete an 
investigation if they are not alive. 
 
Clinical descriptor: Notwithstanding its centrality to pragmatics, presupposition is rarely the 
focus of clinical studies. The reasons for this omission in the clinical literature are unclear 
and may include a lack of understanding of the concept on the part of researchers or 
methodological difficulties in studying it. Also, problems in the use of presuppositions are 
often most apparent in extended conversations and other forms of discourse, all of which 
are time-consuming to record, transcribe and analyse. Those studies which have directly 
examined presupposition include an investigation by Eisele et al. (1998) of the ability of 
children with unilateral left or right hemisphere damage to presuppose the truth of factive 
sentences. Presupposition performance was deficient in left lesion subjects compared to 
age-matched controls. Similar, direct investigations of presupposition in adults have yet to 
be undertaken.  
 
Clinical data:  
Case 5: Presuppositional breakdown is often most evident in conversational exchanges and 
other extended forms of discourse (e.g. narrative). A speaker with pragmatic disorder, for 
example, may contribute a conversational turn which presupposes shared knowledge of a 
person or event with the hearer, when in reality the hearer lacks this knowledge. Similarly, 
the use of certain linguistic expressions during a narrative may presuppose that the person 
to whom the story is being told has knowledge of the referents of these expressions, when 
in fact this is not the case. Just this type of presuppositional failure occurs in the following 
extract from a narrative produced by an 80-year-old man who has dementia with Lewy 
bodies (Ash et al. 2011: 33). The patient is telling the story depicted in a wordless children’s 
picture book Frog, Where are You? (Mayer, 1969). He was instructed to narrate the story as 
if telling it to a child, so simultaneous viewing of the pictures in the book by the speaker (the 
patient) and the hearer did not take place. The scene being described is one in which a boy 
and his dog are searching for their lost frog. In their search, the dog shakes a hive down 
from a tree, and bees are emerging from the hive. Meanwhile, the boy is climbing a tree and 
looks into a hole in the trunk. The patient states: 
 
(a) It’s a … it’s an ug- bees, from- from the one hive, I guess.   
(b) Oh! By golly there’s another one. 
(c) Uh that’s t- about midway the- halfway up the tree, where the tree is- the base is 
broken.                                                                                 
   
In (c), the demonstrative pronoun ‘that’ refers to the boy who has climbed halfway up the 
tree. However, given that he has been newly introduced into the narrative, he should have 
nominal reference (‘the boy’).  Moreover, the tree that the boy is climbing is also new to the 
story and should therefore have an indefinite determiner (‘a tree’). Both referential 
anomalies occur because the patient incorrectly assumes that the hearer knows who the 
boy is and that there is a tree in the depicted scenario. Moreover, he attempts to represent 
this knowledge as presuppositions of his utterance. These presuppositions fail because the 
hearer lacks the requisite knowledge of the referents of these expressions. 
 
3.4 Discourse features 
Unit (a) Discourse cohesion: The interpretation of the events in a story, or the steps in a set 
of instructions, requires that hearers and readers establish links across the individual 
utterances that comprise these narrative and procedural discourses. These links confer 
cohesion on a spoken or written text and allow hearers and readers to construct a 
representation of the meaning of a text. Halliday and Hasan (1976) identified the following 
five cohesive categories: reference, lexical, conjunctive, ellipsis and substitution. In 
reference, a personal pronoun may be used to refer to a person or thing referred to in 
preceding text (e.g. Mrs Smith went into town. She visited five shops). Lexical cohesion can 
be achieved through (i) repetition of a lexical item or (ii) use of a synonym or near-synonym: 
 
(i) The ship took four hours to complete the voyage. Travellers found the voyage unpleasant. 
(ii) The ship took four hours to complete the voyage. Travellers found the journey 
unpleasant. 
 A large range of conjunctions serve to link sentences including and, but (addition), 
consequently (causal-conditional) and alternatively (variation). In ellipsis, elements which 
are required by the grammatical rules of the language are omitted (e.g. Will anyone be 
having a dessert? Sally will, I’m sure). Finally, in substitution a word is substituted by 
another word which has the same structural function. For example, in the following 
exchange, ‘one’ substitutes ‘a chocolate’ and functions as a noun: 
 
A: Would anyone like a chocolate? 
B: I’ll have one. 
 
Unit (b) Discourse coherence: Where cohesion describes intersentential relations in a text, 
coherence captures that attribute of spoken and written texts that allows them to hold 
together or make sense as a whole. The individual utterances which comprise a story may 
exhibit good cohesion. Yet, the hearer or reader may be left with the impression that the 
individual components of the story do not come together in a way that sufficiently 
addresses the point of the story. In other words, a text can be cohesive but not coherent. No 
single linguistic feature bestows coherence on a text. Rather, the coherence of any text 
depends on a range of factors (see Cheng (2010) for discussion).  
 
Unit (c) Information management: The amount of information or content that is conveyed 
through discourse can be determined by a range of measures including the number of 
content units, correct information units and propositions employed by the speaker or 
narrator (see section 6.2.4 in Cummings (2009) for discussion). A narrative that lacks 
content or is uninformative leaves the hearer with unanswered questions about the 
motivations and goals of the characters, the events that took place and much else besides. 
The impression that a narrative is uninformative or lacks content may arise for different 
linguistic reasons. It may be because a narrative is highly repetitive in nature or contains a 
large proportion of non-specific vocabulary.  
 
Unit (d) Topic management: The management of topic in conversation is a complex 
pragmatic skill. It requires a speaker who is able to establish a topic that will be of interest 
to a hearer. Once established in conversation, a topic can only be developed to a certain 
level of detail before termination becomes necessary. Each of these stages in topic 
management is dependent on a close integration of cognitive and pragmatic skills as 
speakers attempt to tailor their selection and development of topics to the knowledge levels 
and interests of their conversational partners. 
 
Clinical descriptor: Each of these discourse features has been the focus of clinical studies. 
Most clinical discourse studies have examined the production of narratives by speakers who 
have sustained a traumatic brain injury (TBI). Non-aphasic TBI speakers have been found to 
produce narratives that contain increased errors of cohesion and coherence, and which 
display poor organization of information and reduced information efficiency (Carlomagno et 
al., 2011; Marini et al., 2011). Problems with information content, and cohesive and 
coherent aspects of narrative production have also been reported in subjects with right-
hemisphere damage (Marini et al., 2005). Discourse deficits in clinical subjects are often 
unrelated to impairments of expressive language (Ellis et al., 2005). 
 
Clinical data:  
Case 6: The boy (‘R’) with specific language impairment in the following exchange was 
studied by Bliss et al. (1998). R demonstrates poor topic management skills during 
conversation with an examiner (‘E’). R fails to develop a topic to any extent before leaving it 
for another topic. However, he eventually returns to the original topic. For example, the 
topics in R’s first extended turn can be represented as follows: leg – toys – leg – bike. In R’s 
second extended turn, his topic structure is similarly digressive: bike accident – death of 
grandmother – funeral – bike.  
 
E: Two weeks ago I had to go to the hospital to have some x-rays taken. Have you ever been 
to the hospital? 
R: Yeah, I had a X-ray because they they’re checking on my leg and I was scared that I was 
going up there and they gave me a balloon and I went to um Toys ‘R Us and gave me a toy 
but I never . . . . .I uh I just broke my leg and I just fall down on my bike because I got hurt 
and my Band-Aids on me. . . . put their off and I jumped out of my bike and I . . . I flied and 
then I jumped down. 
E: You jumped down? 
R: Uhuh, on the grass. . . . and I um our grandma um she died. She um she was getting older. 
Our grandma and she died and the uh funeral . . . My ma and dad went to the funeral and 
then Aunt Cindy was there too and we uh they um uh everybody was sad that um uh that 
died. . . .and on my birthday I went on my bike and I uh um . . . . I just jump on my bike and I 
just balance on my . . . . and I did it with uh I did do it with only my hands. I didn’t do it 
without my hands and I uh um one hand too. 
 
4. Teaching 
In my experience, the type of content outlined above is best taught through a combination 
of classroom activities and e-learning tasks. Each two-hour block of class time is divided 
equally into a structured (but interactive) lecture, and data analysis exercises which are 
completed within small groups. A lecture is the best context in which to introduce pragmatic 
concepts to students, and ensure reliable identification of these concepts across a range of 
utterances. There is a three-part structure to the lecture content in my pragmatics course 
(see section 3). Concepts are introduced and explained within a number of ‘units’. These 
units present theoretical information in chunks which students can readily assimilate. At the 
end of the units relating to a particular concept, students are presented with an overview of 
the types of clients who experience difficulty with implicatures, speech acts and so on. This 
‘clinical descriptor’ introduces students to the findings of research studies and provides 
important orientation to what will be the clinical application of their pragmatic knowledge. 
Students are then introduced to a series of clinical examples such as those presented in 
cases 1 to 6 above. This is the stage at which conceptual misunderstandings can be 
identified and rectified before they compromise students’ ability to analyse clinical data 
with accuracy.   
 
This structured approach to lectures pays dividends when the session turns to the 
completion of the data analysis exercises. These exercises use data from a range of clients 
with pragmatic disorders. The data is carefully selected to ensure that it illustrates the 
particular pragmatic concept(s) discussed in the lecture. Each of these exercises contains 
background information, so that students have a wider context for their analysis. This 
information might describe the communication history of a patient, the results of language 
and clinical assessments, a client’s medical diagnosis and so on. Also, to guide students in 
their analysis of the data, each exercise poses five questions which the students must 
address. These questions are designed to focus the attention of students on significant 
aspects of the data, without denying them the opportunity to contribute original insights to 
the analysis. A sample data analysis exercise is shown in Box 8.1. 
 
 
Box 8.1: Right-hemisphere language disorder 
 
Background:  
 
Speakers with right-hemisphere damage (RHD) experience language and 
communication problems which are quite unlike those found in clients with left-
hemisphere damage (LHD). While speakers with LHD have impairments of 
structural language, most typically in the form of aphasia, clients with RHD often 
display intact structural language and marked deficits in pragmatic and discourse 
skills. 
 
Data:  
 
The following extract is taken from Abusamra et al. (2009: 77-78). It is a dialogue 
between an examiner (E) and a male patient (P) with RHD. The patient has been 
asked to explain the meaning of one of the metaphors from the Protocole 
Montréal d’Evaluation de la Communication (Joanette et al., 2004). 
 
E: What does this phrase mean: My friend’s mother-in-law is a witch? 
P: Let’s change also one word: My son-in-law’s mother-in-law is a witch? 
E: And so what does it mean? 
P: I know she is a person who hasn’t had a pleasant life, throughout her marriage. 
That…that she’s about to be separated from her husband; I’m referring to the 
mother-in-law of my son-in-law (ha, ha, ha) 
E: OK it’s not important – it’s the same. 
P: Certainly! The mother-in-law of my son-in-law. The mother-in-law of my son-in-
law is a witch! 
E: What does being a witch mean? 
P: Because the woman is separated, because all her life she has criticized her 
husband for the way he is; only seen in his defects, who has kept his daughter all 
her life under a glass bell and she’s now a poor lady because she can’t find the 
fiancé her mother would like. 
E: So what does witch mean, then? 
P: What does it specifically mean? It means being tied down to religious sects, to 
religions, to umbanda…who knows, there are so many. 
E: So therefore, “The mother-in-law of my son-in-law is a witch”. Does it mean the 
mother-in-law of my friend practices black magic? And the mother-in-law of my 
friend has many brooms and she is also a bad person an rude? 
P: It’s absolutely clear. My friend’s mother-in-law has many brooms…no! My 
friend’s mother-in-law practices black magic. 
 
Questions: 
 
(1) Humour is an important aspect of pragmatic language use. Does this client 
make appropriate use of humour in his exchange with the examiner? Use data 
from the exchange to support your answer. 
 
(2) Clients with right-hemisphere language disorder often produce egocentric 
discourse. Is there any evidence of this in the above exchange? 
 
(3) How would you characterize P’s understanding of the metaphor presented to 
him? Use data from the exchange to support your answer. 
 
(4) Does P display any awareness that his interpretation of the examiner’s 
metaphor may not be accurate? 
 
(5) How would you characterize P’s use of referring expressions? Use data from 
the exchange to support your answer. 
 
 
 
E-learning is used extensively in the type of pragmatics course I have described in this 
chapter. There are many resources available to students on my university’s virtual learning 
environment. Chief amongst them is a series of worksheets which follow the lecture content 
of the course on a weekly basis. These worksheets are available as Word and PDF 
documents. However, they have also been built into a self-test facility within the virtual 
learning environment. This facility allows students to attempt questions and receive 
immediate feedback on their answers. Students can log their results and I can also view 
their performance. The questions have in many cases a multiple-choice format. However, 
other questions require students to complete blank spaces in sentences from a choice of 
five possible answers, or indicate if statements are true or false. These questions are 
designed to target specific aspects of students’ knowledge of pragmatic concepts and 
disorders. They are undertaken by students following the lecture to which they relate and 
must be completed prior to attendance at the next class. In module evaluation 
questionnaires, students are generally positive about the role played by this facility in their 
learning. While acknowledging that the questions are challenging, they also state that they 
are excellent preparation for the assessments in the course.  
 
5. Assessment 
The pragmatics course I have described in this chapter makes use of formative and 
summative assessment. In terms of summative assessment, the course is assessed by means 
of a two-hour formal examination and a 3,000-word data analysis exercise. Both 
components are equally weighted, which ensures that students who have strengths in a 
particular area (e.g. recall of information during an exam) are not placed at an unfair 
advantage. This weighting also reflects the importance attached in the course to knowledge 
of pragmatic concepts and theories and the application of this knowledge to pragmatic 
disorders in clients. The examination contains 60 short-answer questions. These questions 
have the same format (e.g. multiple-choice questions) as those which students complete in 
the weekly worksheets. The worksheets, therefore, function as a type of formative 
assessment, as students are able to monitor their performance and receive feedback. The 
examination has two sections. In section A, questions target students’ understanding and 
knowledge of pragmatic concepts and theories. In section B, questions assess students’ 
knowledge of pragmatic disorders in a range of clinical groups. Sample questions are shown 
in Box 8.2, with others also available on the website which accompanies this volume. 
 
 
Box 8.2: Examination questions 
 
Section A: Pragmatic concepts 
 
(1) The utterance Jill is unpleasant but popular generates an implicature that it 
was not expected that Jill would be popular. Which of the following terms 
captures the implicature generated by this utterance? 
 
(a) generalised conversational implicature 
(b) scalar implicature 
(c) particularised conversational implicature 
(d) conventional implicature 
(e) nonverbal implicature  
 
(2) The utterance She regretted leaving her job presupposes that she left her 
job. Which of the following terms describes the linguistic feature which 
triggers this presupposition? 
 
(a) change-of-state verb 
(b) iterative expression 
(c) cleft construction 
(d) factive verb 
(e) definite description 
 
Section B: Pragmatic disorders 
 
(3) Clients with schizophrenia are poor at processing aspects of context. In 
view of this, which of the following implicatures is most vulnerable to 
impairment in schizophrenia? 
 
(a) generalised conversational implicature 
(b) scalar implicature 
(c) particularised conversational implicature 
(d) conventional implicature 
(e) nonverbal implicature 
 
(4) Clients who sustain a traumatic brain injury (TBI) often experience 
problems with discourse cohesion. Which of the following behaviours 
constitutes a problem with discourse cohesion? 
 
(a) The client with TBI produces uninformative verbal output. 
(b) The client with TBI fails to use anaphoric reference during narrative 
production. 
(c) The client with TBI does not recover the implicature of a speaker’s 
utterance. 
(d) The client with TBI fails to observe politeness constraints in conversation. 
(e) The client with TBI misses the illocutionary force of an utterance. 
 
 
 
In the data analysis exercise, students are given a choice of four extracts of unseen data. 
Two of these extracts relate to pragmatic disorders in children, and two concern pragmatic 
disorders in adults. The data sets are presented like the sample exercise shown in Box 8.1. 
The analysis is written up in a 3,000-word report, which also includes sections on the clinical 
features of the disorder (e.g. brain pathology in the dementias). In their analysis, students 
must address the five questions which accompany each set of data. 
 
6. Pitfalls 
There are a number of difficulties which lecturers may encounter when teaching pragmatics 
to SLT students. An awareness of these difficulties may help lecturers avoid them from the 
outset. They are:  
 
(1) Conceptual misunderstanding – Students find some pragmatic concepts more difficult to 
grasp than others. This is particularly true in the case of pragmatic presupposition which is 
frequently confused with the entailments of an utterance. The utterance The explorer 
managed to scale the mountain presupposes that the explorer tried to scale the mountain, 
but also entails that he did scale the mountain. Students need to be given ‘rules of thumb’ 
which help them distinguish pragmatic concepts. In the case of presupposition, this could be 
that only presuppositions survive negation.  
 
(2) Erroneous analysis – When exposed to clinical data for the first time, students may 
commit a number of standard errors. They may describe the data in a general rather than a 
specific way, they may fail to use pragmatic terminology, they may overlook significant 
features of the data, and they may misapply concepts. These problems are usually the 
consequence of inadequate theoretical preparation before clinical data is introduced. If 
these problems occur in more than isolated cases, it is a sign that the lecturer needs to take 
a step back and do further explanatory work in order to consolidate students’ knowledge. 
 
(3) Clinical relevance – In many respects, the greatest pitfall for the lecturer who teaches 
pragmatics to SLT students is ensuring the clinical relevance of the course. More often than 
not, lecturers who deliver such a course have a disciplinary background in linguistics which 
does not include the study of language pathology. This makes it difficult for them to adapt a 
standard pragmatics course to the specific learning needs of SLT students. One way to 
circumvent this problem would be for linguistics lecturers to collaborate closely with clinical 
colleagues in the design and delivery of a pragmatics course. Resources permitting, this 
might take the form of two lecturers jointly teaching students, with each contributing their 
specific expertise. In the absence of a collaborative approach to teaching or some 
equivalent, SLT students are likely to query the relevance of the course to their clinical 
needs. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Teaching pragmatics to SLT students presents a number of unique challenges for lecturers. 
These challenges all emanate from the fact that lecturers are not merely aiming to impart to 
students theoretical knowledge of a linguistic discipline. Rather, they are also aiming to 
equip students with the analytical and other skills that are needed to apply this knowledge 
to pragmatic disorders. This further goal is often not easily fulfilled by lecturers whose 
disciplinary background may not equip them to know how pragmatic impairments manifest 
in clients with a range of clinical conditions. This additional step is also difficult for students 
who must assimilate complex conceptual distinctions and then learn to apply them to an 
analysis of pragmatic disorders. The key element in smoothing this transition between 
theoretical knowledge and the development of skills of practical analysis is to embed clinical 
data in all aspects of the content and delivery of a pragmatics course. It is hoped that this 
chapter may provide lecturers with some guidance on how this can best be achieved.  
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